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THE HOBBS ACT AFTER LOPEZ
Abstract: In 1995, in United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court for the
first time in five decades struck down a statute enacted by Congress
under the Commerce Clause. In holding the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990 unconstitutional, the Court established, that Congress'
authority under the Commerce Clause is subject to outer limits, and
that the Supreme Court will strike down federal statutes that obliterate
the distinction between what is national and what is local. This Note
reviews the Court's holding in Lopez, and argues in favor of the
adoption of a two-step approach as the proper judicial inquiry
regarding jurisdictional challenges to the Hobbs Act. The adoption of
this two-step approach will ensure a return to the limited application of
the  Hobbs Act intended by Congress and will preserve our
government's first principle—that the federal government is one of
limited, enumerated powers.
INTRODUCTION
By constitutional design, the federal government is one of limited
or enumerated powers. 1 All other powers are reserved to the states or
to the people. 2 Thus, the federal government must rely on a constitu-
tional provision for each exercise of its power, including the power to
make conduct criminal.3 Among its expressed powers, the Constitu-
tion grants to the federal government the power to regulate interstate
commerce. 4 As a result, Congress has frequently exercised its Com-
merce Clause power to enact federal criminal statutes, including the
Hobbs Act.5
Richard L. McLeese, Federal Criminal finisdiction, ILL. INST. F012 CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUC. I, 2-3 (1997).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
Sre United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2000); McLeese, supra note I, at
3 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995)).
4 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. ("The Congress shall have Power , .. to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States and with the Indian
Tribes.").
5 See id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 18; 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994). Congress has the power
to "make all laws which shall he necessary and proper for carrying into execution" this
enumerated power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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According to the Supreme Court of the United States, federal
legislation authorized by the Commerce Clause falls into three cate-
gories.6 First, Congress may regulate the use of channels of interstate
commerce.? Second, Congress may regulate the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,
even though they may come from only intrastate activity. 8 Finally,
Congress may regulate activities having a substantial relation to inter-
state commerce; activities that substantially affect interstate com-
merce.9
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to strike
down federal statutes enacted under Congress's Commerce Clause
power." In 1995, however, in United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court
for the first time in five decades struck down a statute enacted by
Congress tinder the Commerce Clause." In holding the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 unconstitutional, the Court emphasized
that Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause is subject to
outer limits, and that the Supreme Court will strike down federal stat-
utes that obliterate the distinction between what is national and what
is local. 12
The Court's holding in Lopez has stirred considerable debate
about the proper role of the federal government, specifically in the
area of criminal law." On the one hand, some commentators suggest
that the limits on Congress's power under the Commerce Clause ar-
ticulated in Lopez are insignificant and not likely to constrain congres-
sional action. 14
 On the other hand, other commentators feel that the
language of Lopez may restrict significantly the federal commerce
power and fundamentally alter the balance of criminal authority be-
tween the states and the federal government in favor of the states."
In particular, the Court's holding in Lopez has resulted in dis-
agreement regarding the proper judicial inquiry for addressing con-
6 See Morrison, 120 S.Ct. at 1749; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
7
 See Morrison, 120 S.Ct. at 1749; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
8
 See id.
g See MorWson, 120 S.Ct. at 1749; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60.
15 See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, COMMERCE!, 94 MIcti. L. REV. 674, 682 (1995);
McLeese, supra note 1, at 7.
II See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
12 See id. at 557.
13 See Andrew St. Laurent, Reconstituting United States u Lopez: Another Look at Federal
Criminal Law 31 Count. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 61, 117 (1997); Brandon Bigelow, Note, The
Commerce Clause and Criminal Law, 41 B.C. L. REv. 913 (2000).
14 See Merritt, supra note 10, at 676, 712.
15 See St. Laurent, supra note 13, at 75.
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stitutional challenges to the Hobbs Act. 18 Enacted in 1946, the Hobbs
Act made robbery or extortion that obstructed or delayed commerce
a federal offense punishable by up to twenty years imprisonment."
Like other federal criminal statutes, Congress relied on its commerce
power as the jurisdictional base for the Hobbs Act. 18 Accordingly, for a
defendant to •be convicted under the Hobbs Act, the government
must show that the conduct in question affected interstate com-
merce." Uncertainty exists, however, regarding the degree to which
an act of robbery or extortion must affect interstate commerce to al-
low for federal prosecution under the Hobbs Act." Because of this
uncertainty, many defendants are challenging the constitutionality of
the Hobbs Act. 21
In light of Lopez and the legislative history of the Hobbs Act, this
Note argues in favor of the adoption of a two-step approach as the
proper judicial inquiry regarding jurisdictional challenges to the
Hobbs Act. 22 Part I discusses the Lopez decision and its possible
significance in future cases involving challenges to federal legislation
under the Commerce Clause." Part II examines the Hobbs Act and its
susceptibility to jurisdictional challenges after Lopez. 24 Part III reviews
recent United States Court of Appeals' challenges to the jurisdictional
element of the Hobbs Act. 25 Finally, applying a two-step approach to
jurisdictional challenges to the Hobbs Act, this Note argues for a re-
turn to the limited application of the Hobbs Act originally intended
by Congress. 28
I. UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ
In 1995, in United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court held that a
federal law prohibiting the possession of handguns near schools was
unconstitutional. 27 The defendant, a Texas high school student, ar-
rived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bul-
16 See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994); see also infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.




20 See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes' 6-157 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 158-180 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 27-55 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 56-92 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 93-157 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 158-214 and accompanying text.
27 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
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lets. 28
 Although the student was arrested and charged under state law,
those charges were dropped after he was charged with violating the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 ("1990 Act"), which made it a
federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm in a
school zone.29
 The student was convicted in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas and sentenced to six months
of imprisonment." The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed the, conviction on the grounds that the 1990 Act exceeded
Congress's power to legislate under the Commerce Clause. 31
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Fifth Circuit on
the same grounds. 32
 After reviewing the history of Congress's Com-
merce Clause power and the three traditional categories of federal
legislation, the Court held that if the Act was to be sustained as a valid
exercise of the Commerce' Clause, it must be under the third category
of activity that Congress may regulate — activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce or activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce." The Court held that the 1990 Act exceeded
the authority of Congress to regulate activity under this "substantial
effects" prong of the Commerce Clause power because it neither
regulated a commercial activity substantially related to commerce nor
did the 1990 Act contain a requirement that the defendant's posses-
sion of a handgun in a school zone have a substantial affect on inter-
state commerce. 34
The Court held that the regulation of gun possession in a school
zone did not substantially affect interstate commerce because the
statute was not a smaller part of a larger regulation of economic activ-
ity that would be undercut unless intrastate activities were regulated."
Thus, the Court reasoned that the statute could not be sustained un-
der Supreme Court precedent that upheld regulations of activities
that arose out of or were connected with a commercial transaction
215
 See id.
29 See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q) (1) (A) (Stipp. V 1998).
" See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
51 see al.
32 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
33 See id. at 559. The majority in Lopez held that the statute could not be justified as a
regulation by which Congress sought to protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce
or an article or person in interstate commerce (second prong). See id. at 559. However, in
his dissentjust ice Stevens argued that guns arc both articles of commerce and articles that
can be used to restrain commerce, and therefore, under the second prong, Congress has
the power to regulate possession of handguns. See id. at 602-03 (Stevens, j., dissenting).
34 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551,559-60.
35 See id. at 561.
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and, viewed in the aggregate, substantially affected interstate com-
merce. 36 The Court explained that when such commercial activity is
regulated, the de minimis character of individual instances of the activ-
ity is of no consequence, and the aggregate effect of the class of activ-
ity may be considered in determining the validity of the federal regu-
lation under the Commerce Clause." Although the determination of
whether intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial may in
some cases result in legal uncertainty, the Court in Lopez held that
possession of a handgun in a school zone did not fall on the commer-
cial side of the line."
In holding that the regulated activity in question was not com-
mercial in nature, the Court emphasized the complete lack of con-
gressional findings that possession of a handgun in a school zone sub-
stantially affected interstate cotninerce. 39 Although the Court
conceded that formal congressional findings are not required, the
Court reasoned that such findings could assist in evaluating the legis-
lative judgment that an activity substantially affects interstate com-
merce, even when no such substantial effect. is visible to the naked
eye.4° In the absence of congressional findings or a clear substantial
effect on interstate commerce, the Court was unwilling to consider
the possession of a handgun to be a commercial activity. 41
The Court further supported its holding by emphasizing that the
1990 Act was a criminal statute and that states possess primary author-
ity for defining and enforcing criminal law. 42 The court reasoned that
56 See id;,see also Morrison, 120 S.Ct. at 1750-51 (stating that while the Court need not at
the present time adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any none-
conomic activity, the Court has thus far upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate
activity only where that activity is economic in nature). In Morrison, the Court struck down
the federal civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981
(1994), because Congress lacked the authority tinder both the Commerce Clause and Sec-
tion Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1799.
57 See id. at 558 (citation omitted).
38 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560, 566. But see Lopez, 5l4 U.S. at 619 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Congress could rationally conclude that schools fall on the commercial side
of the line).
39 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63.
4° See id. In Aforrison, however, the Court stated that congressional findings alone are
not sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation and that the
Court must ultimately determine whether particular operations affect interstate commerce
sufficiently to come under Congress's Commerce Clause power. See 120 S. Ct. at 1752.
41 See id. at 561.
42 See id. at 561 ti.3. Although Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to
regulate commercial activities, and this power will at times affect areas of state sovereignty,
that authority does not include the power to take over entire areas of traditional state con-
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to allow federal regulation of all activity related to economic produc-
tivity would effectively obliterate the distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local. 45
 The Court concluded that to "pile
inference upon inference" to support the finding of a substantial ef-
fect on interstate commerce would convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power in violation of
our federal system of government: k 4
Thus, the Court concluded that the activity regulated in Lopez was
not commercial in nature. 45 Moreover, the regulation intruded upon
an area of traditional state sovereignty.46 Accordingly, the Court held
that the government could not justify the exercise of its federal power
based on the aggregate effect of violence in schools.°
In addition to the statute's lack of congressional findings and its
intrusion into an area of traditional state sovereignty, the Court de-
termined that the 1990 Act lacked an express jurisdictional element. 48
A jurisdictional element requires the government to prove as part of
its case-in-chief that the offense in question had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce and was, therefore, subject to the jurisdiction of
the federal government. 49 In the absence of this jurisdictional ele-
ment, the Court held that the 1990 Act did not regulate an activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce."
Thus, the Court established a two-step approach to determine
the validity of federal statutes that are founded on the "substantial
cern. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
For a historical review of the origin and development of state and federal criminal law, see
Bigelow, supra note 13, at 913.
43 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564,567-68. The Court mentioned family law and criminal law
as examples of areas of traditional state sovereignty. See id. at 564.
44 See id. at 567-68.
45 See id. at 561.
46
 See id. at 564.
47 See id.
48 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62. As one commentator put it, by failing to require fed-
eral prosecutors to satisfy any jurisdictional element, Congress almost dared the Court to
find the statute unconstitutional. See Merritt, supra note 10, at 696. It is not clear, however,
that statutes that regulate a commercial activity having a "substantial effect" on commerce
require such an explicit jurisdictional element. See St. Laurent, supra note 13, at 83-84.
Instead, the requirements of Lopez may he read disjunctively; either a regulation of com-
mercial activity, or a jurisdictional element requiring case-by-case inquiry. See id.
46 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62. An example of a jurisdictional element is the require-
ment in the Hobbs Act that the extortion or robbery In any way or degree obstructs, de-
lays, or affects commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).
5° See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
July 20001	 Hobbs Act	 955
effects" prong of Congress's Commerce Clause power." First, courts
must determine whether the statute is part of a larger regulation of
economic activity that could be Undercut unless intrastate activities
are regulated. 52 In conducting this inquiry, courts should look to con-
gressional findings to determine the effect an activity has on interstate
commerce and determine whether the regulation intrudes on an area
of traditional state sovereignty." Second, if the statute is not part of a
larger regulation of economic activity, courts must determine whether
the statute includes a jurisdictional element that requires a case-by-
case determination of whether the individual offense had a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce. 54 In Lopez, the Court struck down
the 1990 Act because the statute failed both prongs of the inquiry. 55
II. THE HOBBS ACT
The Hobbs Act, enacted in 1946 as an amendment to the Anti-
Racketeering Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"), makes it a federal offense to
commit robbery . or extortion that in any way or degree obstructs
commerce.56 To be convicted under the Hobbs Act, the government
must prove that a defendant committed extortion or robbery, and
that such action interfered with interstate commerce." Because the
Hobbs Act only amended the 1934 Act to include conduct by labor
unions, the legislative history of both Acts is relevant. 58
The legislative history of the 1934 Act is replete with evidence
that Congress passed the 1934 Act to eliminate racketeering by organ-
ized gangs, which was found to have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.59 The 1934 Act was first introduced in the Senate in re-
sponse to a Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce investigation
of rackets and racketeering.69 In its report, the Committee on Inter-
state Commerce adopted an official definition of racketeering as be-
ing "an organized conspiracy to commit the crimes of extortion or
51 See M. at 559-62.
52 See id. at 559-61.
55 See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
M See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62.
55 See id. at 567-68.
56 See 18	 § 1951 (1994).
57 See id.; United Slates v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 416-17 (195 6).
55 See United States v. Staszcnk, 517 F.2(1 53, 56-57 (7tli Cii 1975) (en bane).
" See United Slates v. Local 807, 118 F.24 684, 687-88 (2d Cir. 1941) aff'd, United
States v. Local 807, 315 U.S. 521, 539 (1942),
60 See Local 807, 315 U.S. at 528-29, citing 78 CONG. Itt%. 457, (1934); See id. (citing S.
Res, 74, 73rd Cong. (1934) (enacted)).
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coercion, or attempts to commit extortion or coercion." 61 The report
found that thousands of businessmen were being compelled to pay
"dues" for "protection" from gangsters allied with those affording pro-
tection,62
 The report also pointed out that rackets involving the "hi-
jacking" of trucks used to transport merchandise in interstate com-
merce and other acts perpetuated in the field of transportation were
the most common. 63
After passage by the Senate, the bill was redrafted by officials of
the Department of Justice to include a provision preserving the rights
of bona fide labor organizafions. 64 In its support of the bill, the House
Committee on the Judiciary relied upon a letter from the Attorney
General to the Committee which stated that the 1934 Act was in-
tended to make unlawful racketeering "in connection with price
fixing and economic extortion directed by professional gangsters." 65
Thereafter, while the bill awaited the signature of the President, Sena-
tor Copeland, the sponsor of the bill in Congress, submitted a report
in which he referred to the bill as one intended to "render more
difficult the activities of predatory criminal gangs." 66 Thus, the elimi-
nation of racketeering by professional gangsters was the aim of the
1934 Act. 67
The Hobbs Act was passed as an amendment to the 1934 Act in
response to the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Local 807.68
There, the Court held that, based on the proviso of the 1934 Act that
preserved the rights of bona fide labor organizations, labor union ac-
tivities were not subject to prosecution under the 1934 Act.69 The
Court reasoned that it was not the intent of Congress when it passed
the 1934 Act to subject even militant labor union activities to federal
prosecution. 79
In arguing for the adoption of the Hobbs Act, Congressman
Hobbs, the sponsor of the Act, emphasized that the 1934 Act was be-
61 See S. REP. No. 75-1189, at 3 (1935).
02 See id. at 9.
63 See id. at 21-23.
" See Local 807, 315 U.S. at 529 (citing 78 CONG. REC. 5859 (1934)).
63 See id. at 529-30 (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-1833, at 2 (1934)).
66 See id. (citing S. REP. No. 73-1440, at 1 (1934)).
67 See Local 807, 315 U.S. at 530.
68 See H.R. REP. No. 78-136, at 1-2 (1943); Local 807, 315 U.S. at 521.
69 See Local 807, 315 U.S. at 531.
70
 See id. The Court in Local 807 held that labor union activities were excluded from
prosecution under the Hobbs Act although the defendants had been found guilty of
committing highway robberies and, at a rate of 1000 per clay, such robberies were having a




ing amended to address highway robbery by organized labor unions
and was intended to protect individuals and goods in interstate com-
merce." Additional testimony during the debate in the House of Rep-
resentatives clearly establishes that the Hobbs Act was passed to pro-
tect individuals "trying to deliver food into the various big cities in our
nation" and those "who feel they have a right to drive clown ... public
highways and streets ..." 72
 According to Mr. Hobbs, the "sole and
simple purpose" of the Hobbs Act is to protect interstate commerce
and "free the highways and streets of this country of robbers."'" Thus,
the Hobbs Act was originally a subject matter specific statute that ap-
plied only to actions of organized gangs, and, like other subject mat-
ter specific statutes, was passed by Congress only after findings that
the specific type of crime so addressed presented a national prob-
lem.74 This interpretation of the Hobbs Act is further supported by
the initial and long held position of the Justice Department that the
robbery provision of the Act was to be utilized only in instances "in-
volving organized crime, gang activity, or wide-ranging criminal activ-
ity. ,, 75
In 1956, in United States v. Green, the Supreme Court held that the
Hobbs Act was constitutional and that Congress had the authority to
enact the legislation under its Commerce Clause power." In Green,
union representatives were found guilty after a jury trial of extortion
under the Hobbs Act for attempting to extort money from an em-
ployer." The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois, however, arrested the judgment, holding that the Hobbs Act
exceeded the constitutional limits of the Commerce Clause." On di-
rect appeal, the Supreme Court held that extortion upon threat of
violence by organized union members that affects interstate coin-
71 See 91 CONG. REC. 11,912 (1945).
72 See id. at 908 (statement by Mr. Vursell). Mr. Jennings stated "we are just undertaking
to draw a straight line ... between the right. which belongs to the man on his legitimate
mission to market and the misconduct. of a robber ... on a public thoroughfare of this
country." See id. at 912. Mr. Rivers asserted "no longer will they obstruct and retard ... the
orderly transportation of persons and property in interstate or foreign commerce." See id..
at 917.
75 Sec id. at 912 (statement by Mr. Hobbs).
74 See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text; see also St. Laurent, supra note 13, at
62.
75 See McCleese, stipm note 1 at 14-15, (citing DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES AT-
TORNEY'S MANUAL, tit. 9, § 131.040.
76 See Green, 350 U.S. at 420-21.
77 See id. at 416.
78 See id.
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coerce falls within the terms of the Act and that the Act is within Con-
gress's Commerce Clause powers." The court, however, held that the
record did not contain evidence showing that the extortion affected
interstate commerce, and remanded the case to the district court for a
determination of whether the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act
was satisfied.80
Likewise, in 1975, in United States v. Staszcuk, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the jurisdictional
reach of the Hobbs Act is co-extensive with the power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause. 81
 In Staszcuk, the defendant, a local Al-
derman, was found guilty after a jury trial in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois of violating the Hobbs
Act. 82 The defendant had received $3000 to support a zoning change
authorizing the construction of a new building that was never con-
structed." The defendant appealed the conviction, claiming that be-
cause the building was never constructed there was no evidence that
either the zoning change or the payment had any effect on interstate
commerce. 84
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en Banc, held
that the extortion fell within the scope of the Hobbs Act. 85 In uphold-
ing the conviction, the court observed that the primary purpose of
the Commerce Clause was to secure freedom of trade. 86
 The court
determined that, because the Hobbs Act's purpose "unambiguously
parallels" the purpose of the Commerce Clause, the Act must receive
an expansive construction to allow Congress to exercise its full
power.87
 The Court of Appeals reasoned that, because Congress exer-
cised its full power under the Commerce Clause in enacting the stat-
ute, Congress intended the Act to cover all restraint of any commerce
within the scope of the Commerce Clause. 88 Therefore, the court held
that no actual interference with interstate commerce was required
and a realistic probability that an extortionate transaction will have
" See id. at 420-21.
88 See id. at 421.
81 See United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 58 (7th. Cir. 1975) (en bane).
82 See id. at 56.
85 See id.
s' See id. at 55.
85 See id. at 56, 59.
86 See Staszcuk, 517 F.2d at 58.
87
 See id.
88 See id. at 59.
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some effect on interstate commerce was sufficient to uphold a convic-
tion under the Act. 89
Since Green and Staszcuk, the lower courts have expanded the
Hobbs Act to permit the federal government to prosecute virtually
any economically motivated crime. 90 For example, individuals not re-
lated to organized gangs or associations have been convicted under
the Hobbs Act for purely local and isolated robberies of retail estab-
lishments, despite the minimal effect the individual robberies had on
interstate commerce." Because the Hobbs Act has been applied to
such a variety of economically motivated crimes, many commentators
now consider it a non-subject matter specific statute, the application
of which is no longer limited to the protection of persons or goods in
interstate commerce or the prosecution of robbery and extortion by
organized gangs. 92
III. POST-LOPEZ CHALLENGES TO THE JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT OF
THE HOBBS ACT
Despite the majority opinion in Lopez, lower federal courts have
generally rejected jurisdictional challenges to the Hobbs Act, even
where the connection to interstate commerce was minimal or non-
existent." In finding the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act to be
satisfied, lower courts commonly have considered the potential ag-
gregate effect of an entire class of activity rather than determining
whether the regulated activity is commercial in nature, or whether
defendant's conduct alone has had a substantial effect on com-
merce." Nevertheless, Lopez has produced considerable uncertainty in
the lower courts regarding the proper judicial inquiry for challenges
to the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act. 95
" See id. at 59, 60.
99 See St. Laurent, supra note 13, at 62.
91 See, e.g., United States v. Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
120 5. Ct. 211 (1999); United States v. Alfonso, 143 F.3d 772, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1998); United




St. Laurent, supra note 13, at 62. "Non-subject matter specific" statutes regulate a
broad range of conduct and stand in contrast to "subject matter specific" statutes that gov-
ern a specific market or property that Congress wishes to protect. See id.; United States v.
Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1999) (en ham) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2195 (2000).
93 See infin notes 96-155 and accompanying text; St. Laurent, supra note 13, at 63, 88.
9 '1 See infra notes 96-155 and accompanying text; St. Laurent, supra note 13, at 63, 88.
95 See St. Laurent, St! pro note 13, at 84-85, 87-88, 92.
960	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 41:949
In 1999, in United States v. Arena, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit upheld the conviction of two defendants
under the Hobbs Act for extortion and conspiracy to commit extor-
tion.86 There, defendants committed attacks on medical facilities that
provided reproductive health services by pouring butyric acid on the
premises.97 As a result of the attacks, the facilities were forced to close
for several days and undertake a costly cleanup effort. 98 One of the
medical facilities realized a reduction in gross receipts of $18,000 to
$20,000 per month over a three-month period because of the attack."
The Second Circuit held that • this impact on commerce was
sufficient to uphold the conviction under the Hobbs Act.'" The court
reasoned that, because the Hobbs Act prohibits specified conduct if it
affects commerce "in any way or degree," the burden of proving a
nexus to interstate commerce is "de minimis." 1°1 Thus, the Court held
that "Lopez did not raise the jurisdictional hurdle for bringing a
Hobbs Act prosecution" for extortion and the government need only
demonstrate a de ininimis effect upon commerce. 102
Similarly, in 1995, in United States v. Stillo, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction of a defen-
dant under the Hobbs Act for conspiracy to commit extortion. 103
There, the defendant, a local judge, was convicted for conspiring to
accept a bribe from a law firm to fix a misdemeanor case.'"
In upholding the conviction, the Seventh Circuit found that the
burden on the government to meet the jurisdictional element of the
Hobbs Act was slight or de minimis. 198 The court held that the juris-
dictional element of the Hobbs Act was satisfied because, had the
bribe been accepted, the assets of the payer would have been de-
pleted, and therefore, an effect on interstate commerce would have
resulted.'" The court reasoned that, under the "depletion of assets
theory," the law firm that was to pay the bribe had previously pur-
98 See United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 385 (2d Cir. 1999).
97 See id. at 385-86. Butyric acid is a hazardous liquid that emits a powerful, rancid
odor. See id. at 385.
98 See id. at 387, 388.
99 See id. at 391.
100
 See id.
101 See Arena, 180 F.3d at 389-90 (citation omitted).
1 °2 See id. (quotation omitted).
103 See 57 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 1995).
101 See id. at 555, 558.
105
 See id. at 558.
See id.
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chased items in interstate commerce and its ability to make additional
purchases of items in interstate commerce would have been dimin-
ished had the bribes been accepted." 7 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held
that extortion involving commercial actors was economic activity, and
the express jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act ensured case-by-
case determination of a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. 108 .
Also, in 1996, in United States v. Atcheson, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction of defendants
under the Hobbs Act for robbery and extortion.m There, defendants
had lured local businessmen to a vacant building, kidnapped them
and then attempted to gain access to their bank accounts using their
ATM cards. 1 "
In upholding the conviction, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the "substantial effects" test of Lopez did not apply to the Hobbs Act.'"
The court reasoned that the "substantial effects" test only applies to
regulations of non-commercial activities or regulations that do not
contain a jurisdictional requirement that the activity be connected in
any way to interstate commerce. 112 Further, the court.found that, be-
cause the Hobbs Act is concerned solely with interstate, rather than
intrastate activities, Lopez's "substantial effects" test was not applica-
ble.'" The court held that the theft of out-of-state credit cards,
placement of interstate telephone calls and the depletion of assets
resulting from defendants' actions were sufficient to prove a "direct"
connection with interstate commerce. 114 Therefore, the court con-
cluded the de minimis effect of the defendants' actions was sufficient
to uphold the conviction under the Hobbs Act. 115
Likewise, in 1999, in United States v. Wiseman, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the conviction under
the Hobbs Act of a defendant for a series of robberies of grocery
107 See id. The "depletion of assets theory" suggests that a paynient of a bribe depletes
the assets of the person paying the bribe. Accordingly, the payer has fewer assets to pur-
chasesoods in interstate commerce. Thus, under the theory, any bribe paid by an individ-
ual who has previously purchased items in interstate commerce affects interstate com-
merce and federal jurisdiction is appropriate. See id.
li'd See Stillo, 57 F.3(1 at 558 n.2.
1 " See 94 F.3d 1237, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 1996).
11 ° See id: at 1240.
"I See id. at 1242.
112 See id. at 1241.
113 See id. at 1242.
114 See Atcheson, 94 F.3d at 1242-43.
110 See id,
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stores in New Mexico.n 6 There, the defendant had robbed a total of
six grocery stores, taking amounts ranging from $2500 to $20,000. 117
In upholding the conviction under the Hobbs Act, the court first
determined that the distinction between violations of the Hobbs Act .
and common law robbery was that a violation of the Hobbs Act re-
quires some nexus with interstate commerce. 118 Moreover, the court
held that only a de minimis effect on commerce must be shown to
satisfy this jurisdictional requirement.119 Relying on the depletion of
assets theory, the court reasoned that the jurisdictional element of the
Hobbs Act was satisfied because wholesalers from whom the victim-
ized stores purchased products provided goods that originated in sev-
eral other states. 12° According to the court, the conviction was valid
because a jury may infer from a showing that business assets were de-
pleted that interstate commerce was affected to some minimal degree;
the stolen money could have been used to purchase goods in inter-
state commerce. 121 Thus, the court , upheld the conviction of defen-
dant under the Hobbs Act. 122
Applying a different judicial inquiry, in 1997, in United States v.
Harrington, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit upheld a defendant's conviction under the Hobbs Act
for aiding and abetting a robbery. 1" The defendant assisted in the
robbery of a local Roy Rogers restaurant in the District of Columbia
that resulted in the restaurant losing $32 in cash and up to $1000 in
lost revenue due to its forced closing after the robbery. 124 The defen-
dant challenged the conviction, arguing that the evidence was in-
sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act. 125
The D.C. Circuit did not address the viability of the Hobbs Act as
a regulation of commercial activity related to interstate commerce,
and instead addressed only the jurisdictional element of the statute. 126
116 See I72 F.3d at 1201, 1220.
"7 See id. at 1201-03.




121 See Wiseman, 172 F.3d at 1214-15.
122 See id. at 1220.
123 See 108 F.3d 1460, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
124 See id. at 1468.
125 See id. at 1464. The government acknowledged that it might have pled Hobbs Act
jurisdiction based on Congress's plenary powers over the District of Columbia, but did not
seek affirmance on this rationale because the jury was not instructed accordingly. See id. at
•1464 n .1.
126 See id. at 1465, 1466.
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In upholding the conviction under the Hobbs Act, the court stated
that the proper question when reviewing a challenge to the jurisdic-
tional element of the Hobbs Act is whether the evidence was sufficient
to show an "explicit" and "concrete" effect on interstate commerce. 127
The court rejected the claim that the government must show a "sub-
stantial effect" on interstate commerce. 128 Rather the court reasoned
that Lopez requires a showing of a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce only when applied to purely intrastate commercial activi-
ties. 129
The D.C. Circuit held that the robbery in this case interfered
with transactions that were not "purely intrastate" but rather consti-
tuted interstate commerce.m The court determined that the removal
of $1000 front an interstate bank transfer was sufficient to establish a
"concrete" and "explicit" effect on interstate commerce because the
money would have partially financed the purchase of soda from
Georgia and North Carolina, chicken from West Virginia and french
fries from Idaho. 131 In finding a sufficient nexus with interstate com-
merce, the court stated that it was not relying on the aggregate effect
of any class of activity because to do so would be inappropriate where
the nexus between a federal statute and interstate commerce must be
proven in each application of the statute. 152 Moreover, the court
stated that the robbery in question had more than a de minimis effect
on interstate commerce because a "concrete" and "explicit" effect had
been shown. 133
Most significantly, however, in 1999, in United States v. Hickman, by
reason of an equally divided en bane court, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the conviction of several robbery
defendants under the Hobbs Act. 134 There, the defendants committed
a total of seven robberies of local businesses. 135 The greatest amount
of money taken in any of the robberies was $2000. 1 " In the dissenting
lr See id. at 1465 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549),
I" See Harrington, 108 F.3d at 1465.
129 See id. at 1466 (citation omitted).
15° See id. at 1466.
See id. at 1466, 1468-69.
132 See id. at 1470.
13a
	
Harrington, 108 F.3d at 1465, 1470. The court's rejection of the aggregation
principle and the de minimis standard represents a significant narrowing of pre-Lopez
commerce clause jurisprudence. See Merritt, supra note 10, at 678-79.
134 See 179 F.3d at 231. The conviction was upheld because the court was equally di-
vided and only the dissenting justices authored an opinion. See id.
1 " See id. at 230, 231 (Higginbotham, .1,, dissenting).
131 See id. (Higginbotham, j., dissenting).
964	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 41:949
opinion, eight judges argued that the conviction of the defendants
under the Hobbs Act exceeded Congress's authority under the Com-
merce Clause.'"
According to the dissent, the convictions could only be upheld
under the third "substantial effect" prong of the Commerce Clause.'"
In determining what constitutes a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce, the dissenters argued for the adoption of a rule that, in
their opinion, was more in line with the Supreme Court's holding in
Lopez. 139 The dissent asserted that regulation of commercial activities
or activities that are part of a broader scheme of economic regulation
should be upheld under the substantial effects prong of Congress's
commerce power."° In such cases, the de minimis effect on interstate
commerce of the individual instances of such activities is immaterial
because the broader scheme of regulation would be undercut if indi-
vidual instances of the activity were not aggregated.'" The dissenters
argued, however, that noncommercial activities having no interactive
effects on other instances of such activity should not be aggregated;
the individual instances of the activity must themselves have a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce. 142
Applying this analysis, the dissent first argued that the Hobbs Act
is not a regulation of commercial activity because it does not regulate
any relevant interstate economic market, nor does robbery fit into the
conventional understanding of commerce. 143 The Hobbs Act neither
targets any class of product, process or market, nor is it limited to the
157 See id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
"8 See id. at 232 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The dissent rejected the argument
that a conviction under the Hobbs Act for the robbery of a store may he upheld under the
second "person or things in commerce" prong of the Commerce Clause power because a
store is not an instrumentality of commerce and is not itself in interstate commerce. See id.
at 241 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The dissent viewed the second prong as encompass-
ing only vehicles that move in interstate commerce and people or goods traveling in inter-
state commerce. See id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
In See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 234-35 (Higginbothaml, dissenting).
140 See id. (1ligginbothamd., dissenting).
141 See id. at 235 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The dissent cited the Lopez reliance
upon Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) as a compelling example of the recom-
mended rule because the activity in Wickard was commercial and had interactive effects on
others in the market. See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 235 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
142 See id. at 234-35 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
143 See id. at 231, 237-38 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Commerce has grown to in-
clude selling, buying, bartering, manufacturing, agriculture and services, as well as trans-
porting for those purposes. See id. at 237-38 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). There is no
basis for including robbery in economic activity. See id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
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protection of commercial victims. 144 Instead, the Hobbs Act facially
applies to any robbery, or attempted robbery, of any person or en-
tity. 145 Also, the dissent asserted that the legislative record is void of
any evidence of congressional findings that retail robberies have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, and therefore, there is no
rational basis for concluding that Congress was concerned with local
robberies of retail stores. 146 The dissenters argued, moreover, that the
conclusion that robbery is not an economic activity is buttressed by
the fact that robbery is a traditional target of the police power, and
thus falls within an urea of traditional state sovereignty. 147
Further, the dissent argued that robbery convictions should not
be upheld based on the need for congressional regulation to reach
individual instances of a class of activity. 148 Although Congress may
regulate interstate activity as part of a broader scheme of economic
regulation, the dissenters argued that individual acts cannot be ag-
gregated if their effects on commerce are causally independent of
one another. 149 Only where the occurrence of one instance of the ac-
tivity makes it substantially more or less likely that other instances will
occur is there an interactive effect that would justify upholding the
application of the regulation despite the de minimis effect of each
individual instance. 150 According to the dissent, Congress has not
identified any rational basis for aggregation that would entitle the
federal government to prosecute purely local robberies under the
Hobbs Act, nor is any rational basis evident. 151 Instead, Congress
merely has identified a class of objectionable conduct, and has sought
to regulate such conduct as far as possible. 152
144 See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 231 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting),
145 See id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
190
	 id. at 244 (DeMoss, J., specially dissenting). The legislative history of the Hobbs
Act, however, does show that Congress passed the statute to combat highway robberies that
were having a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See id. (DeMoss, J., specially dis-
senting). The regulation of such highway robberies, unlike robberies of local retail estab-
lishments, fits comlbrtably within the second prong of Congress's Commerce Clause
power. See id. (DeMoss, J., specially dissenting).
147 See id. at 238 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Robbery is an area of traditional state
sovereignty under the police power, and where there is ambiguity whether an activity is
economic, determining whether the activity falls within the police power of the states is an
informing means of resolving the ambiguity. See id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
145 See id. at 233 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
1" See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 231, 233 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
150 See id. at 233 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
151 See id. at '242 (Ifigginbotharnd.. dissenting).
152 See Id. at 235-36.
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Accordingly, the dissent argued that to apply the Hobbs Act to a
purely local robbery, it must be shown that the individual robbery
substantially affected interstate commerce. 155 To allow for aggregation
in the absence of commercial activity or a particular regulatory
scheme would sustain federal jurisdiction of almost all crimes, and
thus, conflict with Lopez. 154 In the opinion of the dissenting justices,
the individual robberies in Hickman did not have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, and therefore, the convictions under the
Hobbs Act should have been overruled. 155
As illustrated in the above Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions,
significant uncertainty exists regarding the proper judicial inquiry for
jurisdictional challenges to the Hobbs Act. 156 Accordingly, no uniform
approach has evolved in the lower courts, and direct consideration of
the issue by the Supreme Court appears necessary.'"
IV. A TWO-STEP APPROACH
The overriding concern of the Court in Lopez was that the ration-
ales proffered by the Government in support of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act offered no limitation on Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause.' 58 According to the Court, the enumeration of
powers in the Conuneke Clause presupposes something not enumer-
ated, and when Congress attempts to alter the federal balance by
overstepping its enumerated powers, it is the Court's responsibility to
intervene. 159
 Although many commentators argue that Lopez is a nar-
row decision that will invalidate few federal statutes, the Court's wari-
ness of regulator), rationales that encompass all forms of human be-
havior or intrude on areas of traditional state sovereignty evinces
intent to enforce real limits on the Commerce Clause power.iso I n
particular, the two-part inquiry adopted in Lopez should serve to limit
the application of federal criminal laws, including the Hobbs Act, that
153 See id. at 240-41 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
154 See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 231-32 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
155 See id. al 231 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
156 See supra notes 96-155 and accompanying text.
157 See St. Laurent, supra note 13, at 107.
158 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
159 See id. at 552; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Merritt, su-
pra note 10, at 685-86.
'6° See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; Merritt, supra note 10, at 712; St. Laurent, supra note 13,
at 81.
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are based on the "substantial effects" prong of Congress's Commerce
Clause power.161
Under the two-step approach adopted in Lopez and advocated by
the dissent in Hickman, when addressing jurisdictional challenges to
federal statutes based on the "substantial affects" prong of Congress's
Commerce Clause power, lower courts first should determine whether
the regulated activity is commercial in nature. 162 Specifically, lower
courts must determine whether the regulated activity is part of a
larger regulation of economic activity that would be undercut if indi-
vidual instances of the activity were not regulated. 163
In making this determination, lower courts should review the leg-
islative history of the federal statute in order to evaluate the legislative
judgment that an activity substantially effects interstate commerce. 164
Also, in determining whether the regulated activity is commercial in
nature, lower courts should consider whether the federal statute in-
trudes on an area of traditional state sovereignty such as family law,
criminal law or education. 166 If, under these considerations, the regu-
lated activity is found to be commercial in nature, the de minimis char-
acter of the individual instances of the activity is of no consequence,
and the aggregate effect of the class of activity may be considered in
determining the validity of federal regulation under the Commerce
Clause. 166
If, however, the regulated activity is not commercial in nature,
under the second part of the inquiry adopted in Lopez and advocated
by the dissent in Hickman, the lower courts should determine whether
the federal statute includes a jurisdictional element. 167 For those fed-
eral statutes that include a jurisdictional element, and are therefore
facially valid, the lower courts must determine whether the statute, as
applied, is constitutional; whether the offense in questiOn actually had
a substantial effect on interstate commerce, 168
Applying this two-part inquiry to the Hobbs Act, as advocated by
the dissent in Hickman, lower courts should first determine whether
161 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; Merritt, supra note 10, at 712.
162 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-561; Hickman, 179 F.3d at 231 (•igginbotham, J., dissent-
ing); see also supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
163 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61; see also supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
164 See sepal note 39-41 and accompanying text.
165 SeeSUpia notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
167 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62; Hickman, 179 F.3d at 240-41 (Iligginbothatn, J., dis-
senting); see also supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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the extortion or robbery in question was commercial in nature. 169
Based on the legislative history of the 1934 Act and the Hobbs Act,
only organized conspiracies to commit crimes of extortion or robbery
by organized criminal gangs may be considered commercial in na-
ture. 170 Congressional findings illustrate that extortion and highway
robbery by organized gangs has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce and the Hobbs Act was passed, in part, in response to the
inability of state authorities to alleviate this barrier to free trade. 171
The legislative findings regarding such conduct sufficiently demon-
strate a rational basis for concluding that such activity, in the aggre-
gate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 172 Thus, the de
minimis effect of individual instances of the activity is of no conse-
quence and the aggregate effect of the class of activity may be consid-
ered in determining the validity of a prosecution under the Hobbs
Act. 173
The limited scope of activities subject to prosecution under the
Hobbs Act that may be considered commercial in nature is further
supported by the fact that the Hobbs Act intrudes on an area of tradi-
tional state sovereignty. 174 The Hobbs Act is a federal criminal statute
and, according to the Court in Lopez, the states possess primary
authority for defining and enforcing criminal law. 175 Although all
crime is arguably economically motivated, to hold that all extortion
and robbery is commercial in nature in order to support the finding
of a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce converts congres-
sional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police
power. 176 According to the Court in Lopez, such a federal police power
violates our federal system of government.'"
If the extortion or robbery in question was not committed by an
organized criminal gang, and, based on the legislative history, there-
' 69 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61; Hickman, 179 F.3d at 231 (Higginbotham, J., dissent-
ing).
im See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
in See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63. Al-
though Congress is not required to make fOrmal findings, the Court reasoned that to the
extent such findings would have enabled the Court to evaluate the merits of the regulated
activity as commercial in nature, even though no such substantial effect was plainly evi-
dent, they were lacking here. See id.
173 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citation omitted).
174 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
177
 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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fore may not be considered commercial in nature, under the second
part of the inquiry adopted in Lopez and advocated by the dissent in
Hickman, the lower courts should determine whether the individual
extortion or robbery had a "substantial effect" on interstate com-
merce. 1 " Although the Hobbs Act includes a jurisdictional element
and is therefore facially valid, lower courts must determine whether
the Hobbs Act, as applied, is constitutional. 179 According to the Court
in Lopez, to satisfy the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act, the
government must make a case-by-case showing that the individual ex-
tortion or robbery in question had a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce."°
Despite the clear mandate of Lopez, many circuit courts have up-
held the Hobbs Act as constitutional under the Commerce Clause al-
though the activity in question was not commercial in nature and the
individual crimes committed themselves did not have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 181 In fact, the Hobbs Act has been ex-
tended to potentially federalize any convenience store holdup, grant-
ing the federal government a "general police power" which the Court
in Lopez expressly rejected.' 82 For example, in Arena, the Second Cir-
cuit said that Lopez "did not raise the jurisdictional hurdle for bring-
ing a Hobbs Act prosecution" and that the government only need
demonstrate a de minimis effect upon commerce." 3 Although there
was no evidence of organized criminal gang activity that supported a
finding that the activity in question was commercial in nature, the
court held that a de minitnis effect on interstate commerce was
sufficient to uphold the conviction under the Hobbs Act. 184 The court
reasoned that the Hobbs Act prohibited conduct if it affects com-
merce "in any way or degree" and the burden of proving a nexus to
interstate commerce is therefore de minimis. 185
08 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62; Hickman, 179 F.3d at 240-41 (Higginbotham, J., dis-
senting); see also supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
1 ^9 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
189
 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559, 567; see also St. Laurent, supra note 13, at 63,95,105. To
allow for aggregation of the effects of all robberies would result in a general federal police
power. See St. Laurent, supra note 13, at 95. The Hobbs Act would thus federalize the rob-
bery of every Mom and Pop store that buys coffee, spices or fruit front out of sutte—that is
all of them. See id. at 107.
181 See supra notes 96-155 and accompanying text.
182 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68; St. Laurent, supra note 13, al 95.
185 See Arena, 180 F.3d at 390; see also supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
1" See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
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Likewise, in Harrington, the D.C. Circuit held that a robbery in
which $34 was stolen and the victimized restaurant sustained lost
profits of $1000 satisfied the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act
because the crime had an "explicit" and "concrete" effect on inter-
state commerce. 188
 The court asserted that Lopez required a showing
of a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce only when applied to
purely intrastate commercial activity. 187 The court found that the
$1000 forfeited by the victimized restaurant due to its forced closing
after the robbery would have been transferred to a bank in another
state, and therefore, a "concrete" effect on interstate commerce had
been shown. 188
Applying the two-step inquiry adopted in Lopez and advocated by
the dissent in Hickman, however, the above Hobbs Act convictions ap-
pear to be unconstitutional. 189 Under the first part of the inquiry, no
evidence was brought to show that organized criminal gangs con-
ducted any of the crimes in question and, therefore, that the activity
in question was commercial in nature. 190 The legislative history of the
1934 Act and the Hobbs Act regarding racketeering by organized
criminal gangs is sufficient to demonstrate a rational basis for con-
cluding that such activity, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce."' Nothing in the legislative history of the 1934
Act and the Hobbs Act, however, supports a finding that purely local
crimes such as the ones involved in the above cases have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.192 Moreover, in the absence of legisla-
tive judgment to the contrary, our system of federal government sup-
ports the requirement that the government show as part of its case-in-
chief that purely local crimes, not committed by organized criminal
gangs, have a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce.'" Criminal
law is an area of traditional state sovereignty and, under the police
power, states retain primary authority for defining and enforcing
186
 See supra notes 123-133 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 123-133 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 123-133 and accompanying text.
189 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-62; Hickman, 179 F.3d at 231,240-41 (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
190
 See supra notes 96-155 and accompanying text.
19' See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63; see also supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
192 See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 244 (DeNtoss, J., specially dissenting).
193 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3. Although Congress has the power under the Com-
merce Clause to regulate commercial activities, and this power will at times affect areas of
state sovereignty, that authority does not include the power to take over entire areas of
traditional state concern. See id. at 565-66; see also id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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criminal law.'" Finally, the determination that extortion and robbery
not committed-by organized criminal gangs is not commercial activity
is supported by the Justice Department's original construction of the
Hobbs Act.195 According to the Justice Department's original interpre-
tation of the statute, the HObbs Ad applies only to instances involving
organized crime, gang activity or wide-ranging criminal activity that
has a substantial effect on commerce. 196
Therefore, under the second part of the inquiry adopted in Lopez
and advocated by the dissent in Hickman, the government should have
been required to show that the individual crimes in the above cases
had a "substantial effect" on interstate conimerce. 197 In relying on the
de minimis standard to uphold the convictions under the Hobbs Act,
the Arena and Harrington courts ignored the holding in Lopez that,
within the third prong of Congress's commerce power, "consistent
with the great weight of our case law, that the proper test requires an
analysis of whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' inter-
state commerce."198 For example, in Arena, the court held that the
jury was properly instructed that only a de minimis effect on interstate
commerce must be shown to convict under the Hobbs Act. 199 The
court reasoned that the jury was entitled to infer from the evidence
that some patients of the facilities were from out of state and that the
attacks affected the facilities' purchases of supplies in interstate com-
merce. 200 Thus, according to the court, a de minimis effect on inter-
state commerce had been shown. 201
Likewise, in Harrington, the court held that the jury was properly
instructed that conduct which "in any manner or to any degree" in-
terferes with interstate commerce satisfies the jurisdictional element
of the Hobbs Act. 202 The court found that the robbery removed $30
191 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3,565-66; .see also id, at 583 (Ken ►edyl, concti•ring).
195 See McLecse, supra note 1, al 14-15, (citing DEFT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES AT-
TORNEY'S MANUAL, dt. 9, § 131.040.
155 See id.
07 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62; Hickman, 179 F.3d at 240-41 (Higginbotham, J., dis-
senting); see also supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
195 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
199 See Arena, 180 F.3d at 389-90, 391.
200 See id. at 391.
201 See M.
202 See Harrington, 108 F.3d at 1468-69. The court instructed the jury regarding the in-
terstate nexus element of the Hobbs Act as follows: 'The term obstructs, delays or affects
interstate commerce means any action which in any manner or to any degree interferes
with, changes or alters the movement or transportation or how of goods, merchandise,
money or other property in interstate commerce." See id. at 1469.
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from the restaurant's cash receipts and prevented another several
hundred dollars from coming in, and that this money would have
been deposited in an out-of-state bank and subsequently used for the
purchase of supplies from interstate commerce. 20
 According to the
court, this evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion
that the defendant's conduct had the requisite effect on interstate
commerce. 204 The court reasoned that the victimized restaurant was a
commercial entity engaged in interstate commerce and, therefore,
the loss of cash receipts had a "concrete" and "explicit" effect on in-
terstate commerce.205
In addition to misinterpreting the clear holding of Lopez, by rely-
ing on the de minimis standard, the Arena and Harrington courts
failed to consider that almost all criminal activity affects interstate
commerce in at least a de minimis way. 206 Thus, the de minimis stan-
dard is inappropriate for extortion and robbery not committed by
organized criminal gangs because it would recognize a congressional
power to regulate every act of extortion or robbery. 207 The Hobbs Act,
however, was not intended to "federalize the robbery of every Mom
and Pop restaurant that buys coffee, spices, or fruit from out of
state."208 In fact, the Court in Lopez expressly rejected such limitless
powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause. 209 Specifically, the
Court in Lopez held that the federal government is one of limited
powers, and that Congress does not have a general police power. 21°
The Supreme Court explained that it would not construe the Com-
merce Clause so as to convert the constitutional congressional author-
ity to a general police power. 2n Rather, the Supreme Court concluded
that Congress's power is limited to the regulation of those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce—those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce. 2"
2°3 See id. at 1469.
2°4 See id.
205 See id, at 1465, 1470.
206 See Hickman, 179 17.3(1 at 232 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); St. Laurent, supra note
13, at 63.
207 See St. Laurent, supra note 13, at 63.
208 See Harrington, 108 F.3d at 1473 (Sentelie, J., dissenting).
299 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
21° See id. at 552, 56111.3.
211 See id. at 567.
212 See id. at 558-59.
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CONCLUSION
"The reason for the law is its soul; when the reason for the law
changes, the law changes as well." 213 In order to return to the in-
tended soul of the Hobbs Act, the two-step approach to jurisdictional
challenges set forth in Lopez and advocated by the Fifth Circuit dissent
in Hickman, should be adopted by the lower courts. This approach
ensures the preservation of our government's first principle—that the
Federal Government is one of enumerated powers. 2" Under this ap-
proach, convictions under the Hobbs Act for extortion or robbery
committed by organized criminal gangs should withstand jurisdic-
tional challenges based on the aggregate effect of such extortion and
robbery on interstate commerce. The legislative record of the Hobbs
Act supports such aggregation because such economic activity has
been held by Congress to have a detrimental effect on interstate
commerce. Alternatively, to successfully prosecute extortion or rob-
bery that does not involve organized criminal gangs under the Hobbs
Act, the government should be required to prove as part of its case-in-
chief that the individual instance had a "substantial effect" on inter-
state commerce. By requiring the government to meet the "substan-
tial effects" test set forth above, the lower courts will ensure that a tra-
ditional area of state sovereignty is not invaded. Thus, the con-
stitutionally mandated division of authority, adopted by the Framers
to ensure the protection Of our fundamental liberties, will be main-
tained.
MICHAEL MCGRA1L
215 See Antonin Scalia, judicial Difference to Agency Interpretations of Law, DUKE U. 511,
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214 See Lopez, 514 U.S. a 552.
